Titan Tragedy Has a Culprit — Stockton Rush

According to most experts appearing on national television, the tragedy that took five lives in the depths of the Atlantic Ocean was completely preventable.  And the fact that it was not prevented has been directly and indirectly blamed on OceanGate founder and CEO Stockton Rush and his reckless disregard for obvious safety measures in the construction, testing and maintenance of the Titan.

The only thing that can be said in his favor is that he, himself, believed the submersible craft was safe since he was piloting the doomed vehicle.  His failure to adhere to more stringent safety protocol was not a matter of malicious intentions or greed.  He obviously thought the vehicle was safe.

Rush tended to be brash about the achievements of OceanGate and often bragged about pushing past norms and regulator policies.  He maintained that Titan was an “experimental craft” that did not require following normal industry safety procedures or government certification.  Rush believed those procedures only delayed development and technical progress.

Others saw his shortcuts as reckless and irresponsible.   Some associated with the project had expressed their concerns about the safety of the Titan.  Others refused to ride in the craft out of safety concerns.  

The Marine Technology Society’s Submarine Committee – an international group of submersible developers and operators – wrote a letter to Rush indicating a number of concerns over both the technology and promotion of the vehicle.

The group’s chair, Will Kohnen,  said that he “was not surprised by the tragedy” and that his organization has been aware of this project for some time and have had some concerns^…

In his letter to Rush, Kohnen wrote:

“Our apprehension is that the current experimental approach adopted by OceanGate could result in negative outcomes (from minor to catastrophic) that would have serious consequences for everyone in the industry.”

As an experimental craft, the Titan was not cleared for commercial or tourist use.  So, what were these folks doing on board?  It appears that they were claimed to be a “crew” – not paid passengers.  At $250,000 a seat, they were most assuredly paid passengers.  In fact, crews GET paid.  Only passengers pay.

Rush rationalized the inclusion of paid passengers as Titanic tourists as a means of getting the money for more legitimate scientific exploration of the deepest sea environments. That noble purpose did not justify the reckless approach.

Rush has been criticized for both the safeness of the technology and the promotion of it.  Titan was the first deep-sea submersible to use a titanium carbon fiber hull.  While the vehicle was tested before carrying humans, it was never tested for repeat dives.  According to Kohnen, the tragedy would not have happened if Rush used established and proven construction techniques and material.  “We know how to build them safely, and have done so hundreds of times” Kohnen noted.  “You just have to follow the rules.”

Kohnen added, “We have submarines all over the world diving 12,000 to 20,000 feet every day of the year for research,” he said. “We know very well how to build and how to design these machines and how to operate them safely.”

The “rules,” however, would have required more time, more expense and resulted in crafts with a more limited passenger capacity.  

There was also a Rube Goldberg quality in the construction of the Titan.  For example, Rush used heavy sewer pipes as ballasts.  Titan lacked a lot of commonsense safety devices.  The hatch could not be opened from the inside.   Even if Titan had risen to the surface, the occupants could have suffocated before help arrived.  There was no locator technology onboard – such as “ping” emitters you find on aircraft.  Rather than the product of a technical and scientific enterprise, the Titan too often seemed the product of a do-it-yourself operation.

Rush had also been criticized for using the names of NASA and Boeing in association with the development of Titan when, in fact, they played no role in the technical design or manufacturing  of the vehicles.  Kohnen’ s organizations had previously called on Rush to end those references to Boeing and NASA in his promotional material since it would give a false impression and false comfort to prospective passengers.

In many ways, this was a tragedy and an engineering failure just waiting to happen.  Rush took risks – and most seem to believe, unreasonable risks.

Kohnen was correct in his letter that a tragedy of this sort would impact on the entire exploration community.  There will be repercussions.  There will be new regulations that close the loopholes Rush travelled through.  Perhaps a law against selling seats on experimental crafts.  This could impact on both Jeff Bezos and Richard Branson, who took paying passengers into outer space recently.

In addition to Rush, the list of those lost includes Paul-Henri Nargeolet, France’s most honored explorer, billionaire businessman Hamish Harding, another leading member of the Explorers’ Club, Pakistani billionaire adventure-seeker Shahzada Dawood and his 19-year-old son, Suleman.  Ironically, the younger Dawood did not wish to participate but did so as a Fathers’ Day gift to his dad.

While Rush had won the admiration of the world for his many accomplishments as an explorer and adventurer — and even his sense of daring-do — his legacy will sadly reflect a man who was too reckless – a man who needlessly cost the lives of several people, including himself.

So, there ‘tis.