<p>56 security experts including ;top nuclear and arms verification specialists have signed a petition to President Obama urging him not to veto an anticipated rejection of the deal with Iran, now known as the ;Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).  ; In fact, their assessment reveals not only are there insufficient processes for inspection to prevent continued covert development of nuclear weapons by Iran, but the deal will actually compromise all current intelligence methods for detecting such activity.</p>
<p>This deal is much worse than no deal at all.</p>
<p>According to ;former assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance, Paula DeSutter (THE man who ought to know), &#8220;The signers of this letter have more direct experience in verification matters regarding all areas of arms control and nonproliferation treaties than any existing anywhere in the world. The JCPOA is not verifiable.&#8221;</p>
<p>Attached to the Petition was a <a href="http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/9-2-15-ATTACHMENT-to-9-2-Letter-to-President-Obama-and-Congress.pdf" target="_blank"><strong>15 page addendum describing the fatal flaws</strong></a> of the JCPOA.  ;As we read this, all is in Iran&#8217;s favor to continue their development with barely a hitch.</p>
<p>It states in part, ;&#8220;As one credible analysis has noted, &ldquo;In a breakout or cheating scenario, Iran would need far fewer of these advanced centrifuges in a clandestine plant to make weapons-grade uranium than in one using IR-1 centrifuge.&rdquo; This analysis also observed that Iran would only need 1,125 advanced IR-8 centrifuges to produce<strong> enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon in about two months. ;</strong>The smaller number of centrifuges needed to produce weapons grade uranium means Iran could build smaller and more difficult-to-detect production facilities.&#8221;</p>
<p>And also &#8220;Given Iran&rsquo;s record of violating its binding obligations under the NPT for over 30 years, we judge that the JCPOA is far too lax. Indeed, far from strengthening verification, the JCPOA, as described below, weakens it.&#8221;</p>
<p>And &#8220;The JCPOA process for resolving conflicts regarding IAEA access will almost certainly compromise any intelligence provided by the United States to the IAEA.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>Author&#8217;s note:</strong>  ;This is a nightmare. Instead of a &#8220;go anywhere, anytime&#8221; agreement which has been the mainstay of all nuclear verification agreements, the JCPOA requires that any such visit be justified.  ;That means we have to present any such intelligence data to the Russians and Chinese to demand a site visit.  ;All intelligence methods will be lost. The Iranians will find it much easier to develop their nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>Obama and Kerry could not have done worse.</p>
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